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Summary 
Work Package (WP) 13.2 focuses on the ethical design of the RICHFIELDS research 
infrastructure that draws its data from diverse sources such as apps, social media, discussion 
lists, online forums, data from activity trackers, health platforms, store loyalty cards, and data 
provided by data brokers.  
 
The use of big data that includes personal data for research purposes, whilst providing huge 
opportunities for researchers, raises ethical concerns. Section Two identifies these concerns 
as primarily relating to privacy of an individual as a result of the use of data containing 
personal data (namely identifiers such as name, telephone numbers, addresses, IP address, 
and biomarkers) and an individual’s right of control over his or her data. Both privacy and 
right of control are matters addressed by the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR).  Section Three examines how this Regulation addresses these matters by 
imposing obligations on both the controller and the processor of data when it comes to 
processing personal data. Informed consent is key to legitimizing processing of personal data. 
However informed consent may not always be a feasible route where a research 
infrastructure obtains its data from a variety of sources. The GDPR does recognize the 
importance of data for research purposes and pseudonymisation of personal data is seen by 
the framers of the GDPR as reducing the risks to  data subjects whilst enabling controllers and 
processors to meet their  data-protection obligations. To facilitate legal compliance the GDPR 
requires the controller and the processor to designate a data protection officer (DPO). A DPO 
is required, for instance, where the core activities of the controller/processor consist of 
processing operations which by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or purposes, require 
regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale. Lack of compliance with 
the GDPR will attract large fines. The GDPR also imparts a number of rights to the data subject 
which include withdrawal of consent, right to rectify and objection to processing. Trans-
border data flows are subject to appropriate safeguards. These include legally binding and 
enforceable instrument between public bodies, binding corporate rules (BCR), codes of 
conduct and standard data protection contractual approved by the Commission.  
 
Section Four in providing a framework for the design of the ethical and legal aspects of 
RICHFIELDS includes the following recommendations: (1) use of pseudonymisation with 
appropriate safeguards for unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation; (2) use of appropriate 
technical and organisational measures to ensure GDPR compliance; (3) systems for dealing 
with queries and requests from data subjects; (4) appointment of a DPO; (5) mechanisms for 
handling freedom of information (FOI) requests;  (6) use of suitable data protection clauses 
for trans-border data transfer; (7) obtaining insurance to cover liability in the event of data 
breaches; and (8) the establishment of an independent ethics committee with remit to 
monitor the activities of RICHFIELDS, its protocols on matters relating to security, transfer of 
data to third countries, assessing genuineness of requests from data users and procedures for 
dealing with ethically suspect requests, and procedures for handling requests from data 
subjects.  
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1. Introduction 
Work Package (WP) 13.2 focuses on the ethical issues relevant to the RICHFIELDS project. 
Ethics for the purposes of this work package are restricted to the ethics of big data as 
understood through a review of academic literature. This report does not engage with ethics 
as propounded by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, or schools of 
moral thought such as utilitarianism, virtue ethics or pragmatism. Nor does it try to draw 
connections between these moral philosophies and ethics as conceived in the context of big 
data, though arguably some of the moral philosophies may have influenced our 
understanding of notions such as privacy and control over one’s data (i.e. autonomy) that 
underpin the ethics of big data.1 
 
Big data, consisting of huge volumes of data drawn from diverse sources such as apps, social 
media, discussion lists, online forums, Twitter feeds, status updates on Facebook, data from 
activity trackers, health platforms, home sensors and store loyalty cards and data provided 
by data brokers,2 provide huge opportunities for researchers.  Analysis of big data (that is 
discovering associations, trends and patterns in the data) has the potential to provide insight; 
for instance, in improving life style and the well-being of citizens and contribute to saving lives 
and improving health care management.3 Whilst the value of big data for research can be 
fully appreciated, scant attention has been paid to the ethical consequences such as the 
individual’s loss of privacy as a result of the use of data containing personal data (namely 
identifiers such as name, telephone numbers, addresses, IP address, biomarkers, religious 
affiliation, and  trade union membership). The use of the software Beacon (which linked 
datasets) used by Facebook and the resulting backlash is an illustration of this. The software 
‘connected people’s purchases to their Facebook account [which] advertised to their friends 
what a user had purchased, where they got it, and whether they got a discount. In one 
instance, a wife found out about a surprise Christmas gift of jewellery after her husband’s 
purchase  was broadcast to all his friends — including his wife … Others found their video 
rentals widely shared, raising concerns it might out people’s sexual preferences and other 
details of their private life ...’. 4  The out-of-court settlement, ‘involved the establishment of 
a fund to better study privacy issues, an indication that progress was stepping well ahead of 
ethical considerations.’ 5 
 
                                                 
1 See R Herschel & V M Miori (2017) ‘Ethics & big data’ Technology in Society 49: 33-36 who offer brief accounts of the 
different ethical theories and these theories can be applied to big data. They conclude that the ‘collection and use of big data 
has little to recommend it from an ethical perspective … but it also opens the door to finding ways to mitigate any ethical 
shortcomings’(at 35). 
2 Data brokers typically collect and process data they source from social media, insurance claims, medical devices etc (N Terry 
(2014) ‘Health privacy is difficult but not impossible in a post-HIIPAA driven world’ Chest 146(3): 835-840). 
3 W Raghupathi & V Raghupathi (2014) ‘Big data analytics in healthcare: promise and potential’ Health Information and 
Science System 2:3, <https://doi.org/10.1186/2047-2501-2-3> accessed 1 September 2017. 
4 A Oboler, K Welsh & L Cruz (2012) ‘The danger of big data: Social media as computational social science’ First Monday 17:7 
< http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3993/3269/ > accessed 5 September 2017. 
5 Ibid.  
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This WP examines  ethics as understood in the context of big data, the EU (European Union) 
legislation on data protection that  embraces the ethical concerns,  and the design of the 
ethical and legal aspects of the research infrastructure (RI) RICHFIELDS. Divided into five 
section, section Two (which follows this Introduction) provides an account of our 
understanding of ethics for the purposes of big data and also highlights the connection 
between the ethics of big data and law. Section Three provides an account of the salient 
features of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation6 (GDPR) which comes into force on 
25 May 2018, and highlights the provisions that are of particular importance along with the 
challenges they may pose for RICHFIELDS largely reliant on provision of data by third parties. 
It must be stressed at this juncture that this section is not a provision by provision 
commentary of the GDPR. Section Four  addresses the ethical/legal aspects that RICHFIELDS 
needs to focus on in designing its RI. In doing so it highlights the areas that need to be 
addressed in the governance of RICHFIELDS. Section Five in concluding makes a few 
observations on the potential for future developments. 
2. Ethics for Big Data 
This section in the first part examines the ethical issues that confront the use of big data and 
in the second part delineates the connection between ethics, law and governance. 
2.1. Ethical Challenges 
Sophisticated communications technology, use of algorithms and storage capacity have 
greatly enhanced opportunities for researchers to analyse and use large data sets gathered 
from a variety  of  sources including apps, loyalty cards and activity trackers  to understand 
links and trends and their impact on human beings. Insights thus arrived at have the potential 
to provide specifically targeted services to citizens in areas such as nutrition that would be of 
benefit to private sector organisations (such as those involved in the food industry), public 
sector organisations (such as hospitals), and also drive government policy in respect of 
healthcare. The biggest challenge to big data comes in the form of privacy. Human rights 
instruments, international and regional, protect an individual’s right to privacy.7 Against this 
context the pressing question is how should large data sets be handled for the purposes of 
research? How should we handle the ethics especially in the face of the potential for exposure 
as highlighted in the illustration given in the Introduction? Unlike medical research where 
there are some accepted standards such as the World Health Organisation’s   ‘Standards and 
Operational Guidance for Ethics Review of Health-related Research with Human 
Participants’,8 and those from the UK Medical Research Council, the use of big data for 
purposes other than medical research have not as yet resulted in the formulation of common 
ethical standards to follow. It seems that attitudes to ethics of big data vary and there is much 
                                                 
6 Regulation 2016/679. 
7 See for instance Article 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights. 
8 <http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44783/1/9789241502948_eng.pdf >accessed 1 October 2016. 
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disagreement about the understanding of obtaining informed consent and use of ethics 
review boards.9 Against this foggy backdrop of uncertainty regarding ethics it is important for 
any RI using big data to adopt ethical practices that do not undermine the rights enshrined in 
the human rights instruments and legitimises its standing as a respectable, reliable and 
accountable research tool for researchers. 
 
A useful starting point for the ethical concerns in relation to big data is provided by Mittlestadt 
and Floridi.10 Although their work relates to the bio-medical context, it is nevertheless of 
relevance to RICHFIELDS. Their extensive review of scholarly literature reveals that privacy, 
informed consent and ownership are the most frequently raised issues of ethical concern. 
Given the pervasive character of the human rights instruments and the recognition of 
autonomy it is no surprise that privacy was frequently raised as a principal ethical concern 
with many advocating anonymization and pseudonymisation as a means to preserve 
privacy.11 Informed consent is not new to big data and is a mechanism widely used in research 
widely to legitimise the use of an individual’s data for a particular purpose(s). It does not 
accommodate multiple data sets that are being used for purposes other than those for which 
the consent was sought. Mechanisms often utilised to enable re-purposing are blanket 
consent12 for all potential uses, and tiered consent allowing individuals to permit specific 
uses.13 Use of blanket consent (often used by app providers) is restrictive of individual 
autonomy.14 Consent permitting specific uses also poses problems for research using big data 
since it is impossible to predict the uses of the data sets in the future. In order to balance the 
interests of both the individual  and the researchers governance structures that recognise the 
rights of individuals to withdraw from participation and an independent ethics committee 
that review requests for access to data to determine whether the request would meet the 
ethical parameters without compromising privacy may be helpful. The independence of the 
ethics committee would contribute to the confidence of data subjects in the processing of 
their data for research purposes.15  
                                                 
9 J Vitak, K Shilton & Z Ashktorab (2016) ‘Beyond the Belmont principles: Ethics, practice and beliefs in the online data 
research community’ Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Computer- Supported Co-operative Work & Social 
Computing pp 941-953. 
10 BD Mitelstadt & L Floridi (2016) ‘The ethics of big data; Current & foreseeable issues in biomedical context’ Sc Eng Ethics 22: 
301-341. 
11 A Markowetz, K Blaszkiewicz, C Mentag, C Switala, & TE Schlaepfer (2014)  ‘’Psycho-informatics: Big data shaping modern 
psychometrics’ Medical Hypotheses 82(4): 405-411; S Choudhury, J R Fishman, M L McGowan, & ET Joengst (2014) ‘Big 
data, open science and the brain: lessons learned from genomics’ Frontiers of Human Neuroscience 8: 239, 
doi:  10.3389/fnhum.2014.00239 accessed 1 September 2017.  
12 JPA Ioannidis (2013) ‘Informed consent, big data and the oxymoron of research that is not research’ American Journal of 
Bioethics 13(4): 40-42.  
13 MA Majumdar (2005) ‘Cyberbanks and other virtual research repositories’ Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 33(1); 31-39. 
14 Z Master, L Campo-Engelstein & T Caulfield (2015) ‘Scientists’ perspectives on consent in the context of bio-banking 
research’ European Journal of Human Genetics i23(5): 569-574. 
15 See for instance the UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council  which acts as an independent guardian of the UK Biobank 
Ethics and Governance Framework and advises on its revisions, monitors and reports publicly on the conformity of the UK 
Biobank project with the framework and advises more generally on the interests of research participants and the general public 
in relation to UK Biobank <https://egcukbiobank.org.uk/Ethics-and-governance-framework.html >  accessed 1 October 2017. 
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Ownership, the other feature identified,) is as Mittelstadt & Floridi acknowledge a complex 
concept. It could refer to the right to control data (namely, empowerment of the individual 
to control the means and ways in which his data is being utilised) and rights to benefit from 
the data (such as intellectual property rights that reside in the database and innovation from 
big data analysis which are examined in Work Package 13.1). Another related issue in respect 
to ownership is how an RI with vast quantities of data from different sources maintains data 
integrity.  
There are  three ethical principles that impact on research involving human subjects in 
biomedical and  behavioural research.  These succinctly stated in the Belmont Report16  are 
also of general relevance. The principles enunciated are: respect for persons, beneficience, 
and justice. Respect for persons encapsulates two ethical concerns: the treatment of 
individuals as autonomous agents, and persons with diminished responsibility (vulnerable 
class) are protected. Beneficience is viewed as an obligation and finds expression in the duty 
not to do harm and to maximise possible benefits and minimise possible harms. Justice is 
understood as fairness in distribution and in the context of research refers to the duty to 
ensure that the selection process of research participants is directly related to the research 
study rather than on their easy availability due to their confinement in an institution,  or 
vulnerability by virtue of belonging to a racial minority group. Where the research is publicly 
funded there is a duty to ensure wide distribution of the benefit of any advancement in 
therapeutic procedures or devices and that it be not restricted to those who can afford them. 
2.2. Ethics, Law and Governance  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights imparts everyone with the right to protection of 
personal data concerning him or her. Personal data and the rights of individuals are protected 
by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It focuses on privacy, informed consent, 
protection for certain types of data (e.g. racial origin, political affiliation),  and ownership (in 
the form of control over data), identified as ethical concerns in 2,1 above. The ethical 
concerns elucidated through a legal instrument establishes the close relationship there is 
between the ethics of privacy in personal data and the law of privacy and personal data.  At 
this juncture it would apt to point out that the right to privacy, covering the right to protection 
of person’s identity, name, gender, appearance and dignity, is not the same as the right to 
private life. The right to private life is wider than the right to privacy and includes the ‘right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings’.17  The EU legislation 
                                                 
16 The Belmont Report, available at 
<https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/20054178b_09_02_Belmont%20Report.pdf> (accessed 21 January 2018). 
The other documents that impact ethics relating to research involving human subjects include the Nuremberg Code, and the 
Helsinki Declaration. See Bernard A Fischer Jr (2006) ‘A summary of important documents in the field of research ethics’ 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 32(1): 69-80.    
17 Niemitz v Germany (Application No 13710/88, Judgment of 16 December 1992. In Para. 29 stated: 
The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of "private life". 
However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an "inner circle" in which the individual may live his own 
personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. 
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recognises, as will be seen in Section 3 below, the rights of individuals (data subjects) over 
their personal data and protects the individuals by imposing responsibilities and liabilities on 
those engaged in processing personal data of individuals. The GDPR also imposes obligations 
in respect of data and security, thus expecting those who process to have governance 
structures in place to ensure compliance with the GDPR. The governance framework of 
RICHFIELDS is enunciated in WP 13.3.  
3. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)  
This section provides an account of the salient features of the GDPR and examines the key 
provisions that are likely to be of relevance in designing the ethical and legal aspects of  
RICHFIELDS. By no means is this section a commentary on all the provisions of the GDPR.18 
There is no attempt to compare the GDPR with the Data Protection Directive, the reason being 
that the GDPR will come into effect in the EU Member States in May 2018. As for the UK, the 
Queen’s Speech on 21 June 2017 confirmed that after its departure from membership of the 
EU the Government’s intention is to bring the GDPR into UK law to ensure that UK’s data 
protection framework is ‘suitable for our new digital age, allowing citizens to better control 
their data’. 19 The plan is ‘to implement the General Data Protection Regulation and the new 
Directive which applies to law enforcement data processing … helping to put the UK in the 
best position to maintain our ability to share data with other EU member states and 
internationally after we leave the EU’.20  
3.1. Rationale for the GDPR 
The GDPR replaces the data protection framework created by the EU Data Protection 
Directive 1995.21 Being a Directive, Member States had some manoeuvrability in 
implementing the Directive resulting in divergent laws producing uncertainty and 
inconsistency.  When data was transferred from one state to another, for instance from the 
UK to Spain, the data was subject to different national laws which undermined confidence in 
the digital economy.   The GDPR changes this.  In being a Regulation it is self-executing and 
will result in harmonisation in the laws relating to data protection amongst member states. 
The EU policymakers were also of the view that the GDPR would modernise the aging data 
protection framework of the Directive since the role and use of personal data by society and 
commerce had evolved since 1995 greatly making a noticeable impact on the economy. 
                                                 
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with 
other human beings. 
18 For instance, this section does not consider provisions relating to supervisory authority, their competence and powers, or the 
establishment of the European Data Protection Board and their remit. Neither does it examine in any detail the provisions 
relating to fines and penalties. 
19 The Queen’s speech and associated background briefing, on the occasion of the opening of parliament on Wednesday 21 
June 2017. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/620838/Queens_speech_2017_background_no
tes.pdf > p 46, accessed 10 October 2017. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the protection of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.  
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According to the EU Communication, ‘the EU’s 1995 Directive, legislative instrument for the 
protection of personal data in Europe, was a milestone in the history of data protection. Its 
objectives, to ensure a functioning Single Market and effective protection of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals, remain valid. However, it was adopted 17 years ago when 
the internet was in its infancy. In today's new, challenging digital environment, existing rules 
provide neither the degree of harmonisation required, nor the necessary efficiency to ensure 
the right to personal data protection. That is why the European Commission is proposing a 
fundamental reform of the EU's data protection framework.’ 22 Protection of individuals’ right 
to privacy is seen as pivotal whilst engaging with the digital economy. As the EU 
Communication notes, ‘In this new digital environment, individuals have the right to enjoy 
effective control over their personal information.23 Data protection is a fundamental right in 
Europe, enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,24 
as well as in Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)2526, 
and needs to be protected accordingly.’27  The purpose of the GDPR is therefore to improve 
individuals’ control over their personal data through consent and also enable through 
harmonisation the ease of transfer within the European Economic Area (amongst EU member 
states and Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland). In better protecting an individual’s control over 
his/her personal data the GDPR increases the responsibilities and level of compliance of most 
organisations that deal with such data. Consent, which is central to the legitimising of 
processing of individuals’ data, and responsibilities and the compliance measures required by 
the GDPR are considered in the following sections.  
 
Before proceeding it must be pointed out that there are similarities between some of the 
provisions of the GDPR and those of the earlier Data Protection Directive. National courts are 
likely to look at earlier European Court of Justice judgments relating to data protection for 
ease of  interpretation. The courts which adopted a purposive approach when interpreting 
the Data Protection Directive28 are also likely to apply the purposive approach by looking to 
the intention of the legislation and the specific provision. The recitals may also be useful for 
                                                 
22 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European Data Protection 
Framework for the 21st Century’ COM(2012) 9 final, 25.1.2012<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0009&from=en >p,2, accessed 12 December 2016. 
23 Author’s emphasis. 
24 Article 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  ((2000/C 364/01) reads: 
Protection of personal data  
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collecte 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.   
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.  
25 OJ C326/47, 26.10.2012. Article 16(1) reads: 
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them.  
27  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European Data Protection 
Framework for the 21st Century’ COM(2012) 9 final, 25.1.2012<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0009&from=en >p,1, accessed 12 December 2016. 
28 Case C-73/07 Satamedia [2008] ECR I-09831, paragraph 51. 
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the purposes of interpretation. However they only are a means to explain by giving reasons 
for the legislation and should not be viewed as normative provisions.29  
3.2. Legitimising processing through consent 
As stated earlier, Article 830 of the Charter of Fundamental of the European Union provides 
every individual has the right to protection of personal data about him or her. To legitimise 
processing consent is pivotal. The GDPR emphasises consent and imposes significant 
responsibilities on entities that process data. For consent to be valid (1) it must be freely 
given; (2) a proper explanation of what the individual is consenting to must have been 
provided before the consent is obtained; (3) separate consents must be given for separate 
purposes;31 (4) consent can be refused; and (most important of all) (5) consent can be 
withdrawn at any time.32 The GDPR expects all consent (be they from a child or an adult) to 
meet the above conditions. However, in the case of children below sixteen they require the 
authority of the person with parental responsibility.33 
 
The burden of proof that the data subject has consented lies with the controller. There is no 
requirement in the GDPR that it be in writing but for evidential purposes it is likely to be in 
writing. Silence on the part of the individual when agreement is sought would not meet the 
threshold imposed by the GDPR. For the individual to give consent freely he/she has to 
understand what is being sought by the controller. Clauses in consent agreements which are 
complex and lack clarity are unlikely to meet the consent threshold. 
 
It is possible that there are existing consent agreements that have been obtained under 
legislation implementing the Data Protection Directive. These consent agreements need to 
meet the current standards set by the GDPR. If they do not then fresh consent needs to be 
obtained. This requirement is a challenge for RIs. Many of the third parties such as app 
providers collecting data on food purchase and food consumption who supply data to 
RICHFIELDS may have obtained general consent which does not indicate how the data could 
be used for  other purposes or what those purposes are likely to be since it is difficult to 
predict hitherto unknown research uses for the data. These types of consent agreements are 
unlikely to meet the basic condition of separate consents given for separate purposes 
imposed by the GDPR. This creates a barrier to sharing data for research purposes. However 
Recital 33 recognises that, ‘[i]t is often not possible to fully identify the purpose of personal 
data processing for scientific research purposes at the time of data collection’. In these 
circumstances, ‘data subjects should be allowed to give their consent to certain areas of 
scientific research when in keeping with recognised ethical standards for scientific research. 
                                                 
29 European Union (2015) Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for persons 
involved in the drafting of European Union Legislation Luxembourg: Publications of the European Union, Guideline10. 
30 See fn 20 for text of Article 8. 
31 Author’s emphasis. 
32 Article 7. 
33 Article 8. 
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Data subjects should have the opportunity to give their consent only to certain areas of 
research or parts of research projects to the extent allowed by the intended purpose’. While 
recognising the importance of data for research purposes this recital states that ethical 
standards for scientific research need to be met and the individual (i.e. data subject) is given 
the opportunity to give consent to specific areas of research or research projects.  So RIs that 
collect and provide access to data for research purposes will have to ensure that ethical 
standards for research are met and provide opportunities to individuals to give their consent.  
Further processing which is for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes will not be considered to be incompatible with the 
initial purposes.34 Ethical standards for scientific research may vary from state to state 
although instruments such as the Helsinki Declaration (which sets out the ethical principles 
for medical research on human subjects) and Code of Ethics produced by the International 
Sociological Association, may provide a workable framework for bringing about some degree 
of harmonisation in ethical standards for research purposes.35 
 
In the context of informed consent a recent development may well prove  to be an useful  
route for research purposes.  Termed dynamic consent,36 it is a personalised digital interface 
with the participant which enables continuous engagement between the participant and 
researcher. Being participant-centric it  puts the participants in control of their data and their 
uses. It replicates the informed consent model common in medical research but uses a digital 
interface. Dynamic consent been used in a number of research projects such as RUDY (Rare 
UK Diseases of  Bone Joints and Blood Vessel)37 and CHRIS (Co-operative Health Research in 
South Tyrol).38 Both these studies have limited number of participants, thus making it possible 
for continuous two-way communication. Adoption of this approach by RIs may pose 
difficulties especially where data is acquired from a variety of sources. The RI would need to 
make adaptations to its technical architecture and the procedures for acquiring information 
from third parties. The RI would also need to be clear about the role it plays: for instance, is 
the RI a broker between the researcher and the participants? If this is the case, it needs to 
reflect on questions such as the nature of its legal relationships with third parties who supply 
it with data and the researchers who access the RI.   
                                                 
34 Article 5(1)(b). 
35 See also European Commission (2013) Ethics for researchers: Facilitating research excellence in FP7 (Brussels: European 
Commission).   
36 Haws Williams, Karen Spencer & William G Dixon (2015) ‘Dynamic consent: A possible solution to improve patient 
confidence and trust in how electronic patient records are used in medical research’  JMIR Med. Inrmar. 3(1) e 3, J Kaye, EA 
Whitley, D Lund et al (2015) ‘Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first century research network’ Eur J Hum Genet , 
23(2) 141 – 146. 
37 See <https://www.ndorms.ox.ac.uk/research-groups/javaid-group-rare-bone-diseases-and-osteoporosis-
epidemiology/projects/rudy> accessed 10 March 2018, M K Javaiad, L Forestier-Zhang et al (2016) ‘The RUDY study platform 
– a novel approach to patient driven research in rare musculoskeletal diseases’ Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases (11):150 
<https://doi.org/10.1186/s13023-016-0528-6> accessed 17 March 2018. 
38 For more details on this project  http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/health/biomed/projects/Pages/default.aspx. 
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3.3. Who does the GDPR protect? 
As indicated in 2.1., the GDPR aims to give control to an individual over his/her data. It 
therefore lays down rules in relation to the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of their personal data. The GDPR therefore does not protect data of entities such 
as companies, charitable organisations and associations.39 The protection afforded by the 
GDPR is not linked to the nationality or place of residence of the natural persons.40 So where 
an individual (that is a data subject) is present in the EU he/she is protected even in the 
absence of place of residence in the EU. To illustrate, if Joe (a US citizen with no place of 
residence in the EU) were to subscribe to a retail store (e.g. Boots in the UK) and provides 
personal data, Joe’s data falls within the scope of the GDPR.  The GDPR however does not 
apply to a citizen of an EU state (with a place of residence in the EU) were he/she to give her 
personal data whilst in a non-EU state.  So if Jane whilst visiting the US were to give her data 
(such as her address,  phone number, passport details) to Macy’s in New York the personal 
data gathered will not be subject to the GDPR. The data given will be governed by US laws. 
3.4. What type of data does the GDPR apply to?  
The GDPR applies to personal data. The GDPR in Article 4(1) defines ‘personal data’ as any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)’. So data 
such as height, weight, and address of John Smith would constitute personal data.  Personal 
data also includes data of ‘one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’.  So if X can be identified on the 
basis of data such as the rich Russian who owns a football club and lives close to Oxshott, 
Surrey, then such data would classify as personal data because of indirect identification. 
3.4.1. Prohibition in respect of processing of certain types of personal data 
There are certain types of personal data the processing of which is prohibited by the GDPR.41  
Data ‘revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or 
trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose 
of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural 
person's sex life or sexual orientation’ fall within this category. There are however a number 
of exceptions to the general prohibition, which include ‘processing necessary for the purposes 
of preventive or occupational medicine; for the provision of health or social care or treatment 
or the management of health or social care systems and services; for reasons of public interest 
                                                 
39 Recital 14 states: 
This Regulation does not cover the processing of personal data which concerns legal persons and in particular 
undertakings established as legal persons, including the name and the form of the legal person and the contact 
details of the legal person. 
40 See Recital 14 which states:  
‘The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of 
residence, in relation to the processing of their personal data….’  
41 Art 9(1). 
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in the area of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats’.42 This 
prohibition also is not applicable  where ‘the data subject has given explicit consent to the 
processing of those personal data for one or more specified purposes’ unless the laws of the 
EU or the Member State provide that the general prohibition referred to paragraph 1 may not 
be lifted by the data subject’.43 The exceptions mean that processing of excluded data for the 
purposes of healthcare and preventive medicine is justifiable. Big data (with its potential to 
detect novel associations and enabling predictive links) is widely viewed as a vital source for 
medical innovations and health care. A report from McKinsey, for instance, highlights some 
of the benefits which include improving healthcare, well-being and improving the cost of 
care.44 The contribution of big data is also recognised by politicians. For instance, in 2011, 
David Cameron (the then Prime Minister of the UK) said that every NHS (National Health 
Service) patient should be a ‘research patient’ and their data opened up to private healthcare 
firms.45 He also went on to say this ‘does not threaten privacy, it doesn't mean anyone can 
look at your health records, but it does mean using anonymous data to make new medical 
breakthroughs.’46  
3.5. When does the GDPR apply? 
The GDPR applies to both manual and automated processing of personal data. Processing is 
defined in Article 4(2) as ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal 
data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, 
recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.’ The wide definition adopted indicates that 
manual filing systems also fall within the GDPR as long as it is structured to specific criteria.   
The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of the 
establishment of a controller or processor in the European Union. The place of processing is 
immaterial. So where a controller/processor has a place of establishment in the EU but the 
processing takes place in China, for instance, the GDPR will apply. In order to determine 
whether the GDPR applies one has to look to the establishment of the controller/processor.47 
According to Recital 22 in determining establishment one has to consider where the activity 
is effectively carried out through stable arrangements. The legal form of the arrangements in 
the form of a branch or subsidiary with legal personality is not to be regarded as determining 
                                                 
42 Art 9(2). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Center for US Health System Reform, Business Technology Office (2013) The ‘big data’ revolution in health care’ McKinsey 
& Co, < http://achc.org.co/hospital360/contextos/Tecnologia_e_Informacion/Big_Data/Revolucion_de_la_Informacion.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2017. See also D N Reshef, YA Reshef et al (2011) ‘Detecting novel associations in large data sets’ 
Science 334: 1518-1524. 
45 BBC News ‘Everyone “to be a research patient”, says David Cameron’, 5 December 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
16026827 accessed 1 September 2016. 
46 Ibid. The news inevitably attracted criticism in putting commercial interests( ahead of patient privacy.  Patient Concern said 
there were real worries about the proposal to make patients' medical data available to private firms as the information would 
include postcodes and age profiles which would be possible to trace back to the individuals concerned. 
47 Art 3(1). 
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factor. To illustrate, an RI that collects data on consumers’ in-store behaviour and shopping 
patterns with personnel in the Netherlands who decide on matters such as types of data to 
collect, mechanism for data collection, purposes of the data, types of access to researchers, 
will be subject to the GDPR even though the technology for storing/processing may be  
located in a non-EU state.  
 
As stated earlier, the focus of the GDPR is to protect data subjects within the EU. In order to 
protect them in cases where their data is collected from outside the EU for instance through 
e-commerce, the GDPR extends its territorial scope. So data controller/data processors 
outside of the EU have to be GDPR compliant where they process personal dataof individuals 
who are in the EU (nationality, residence of data subject are irrelevant) and where the 
processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in 
the EU, or the monitoring the behaviour of such data subjects.48 In order to determine 
whether goods or services are being offered to data subjects in the Union intention is a core 
ingredient. It is important to establish whether the controller/processor intended to offer the 
goods to the data subject in the EU. Mere accessibility to the controller’s website, contact 
details, email address, and the use of a language (that is generally used in the country of the 
controller’s establishment) are insufficient for establishing the required intentions. Factors 
that may be relevant to establish intention include ‘the use of a language or a currency 
generally used in one or more Member States with the possibility of ordering goods and 
services in that other language, or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the 
Union’.49 To illustrate, if a data subject in the EU can order goods from the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art’s shop in New York which provides shipping rates to destinations in the EU, it 
is apparent that it intends to sell goods to data subjects in the EU. This means that it needs to 
meet the standards set by the GDPR in the processing of personal data of the data subject.  
As for the question whether the controller/processor’s activity amounts to monitoring of data 
subjects in the EU, according to Recital 24 it should be ascertained whether natural persons 
are tracked on the Internet including potential subsequent use of personal data processing 
techniques which consist of profiling a natural person, particularly in order to take decisions 
concerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal preferences, 
behaviours and attitudes’. This suggests that websites such as nutrition websites and recipe 
websites, that may collect information on searches for vegan diet, paleo diet and collect IP 
addresses and other details, would need to be GDPR compliant even if they are not located 
in the EU.  
It is also possible for the GDPR to apply to processing as a result of the application of the rules 
of private international law. One such illustration provided by the GDPR is a controller not 
established in the Union, such as in a Member State's diplomatic mission or consular post.50 
                                                 
48 Article 3(2). Author’s emphasis of phrases ‘offering of goods or services’ and ‘monitoring the behaviour’ from Article 3(2). 
49 Recital 23. 
50 Recital 25. 
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3.5.1. Processing falling outside the scope of the GDPR (Anonymised data) 
De-identification (or anonymization)51 of data is often offered as a panacea to avoid the rigid 
framework of data protection laws that act in the interests of data subjects. It is a process 
where by all the identifiers of a data subject are stripped (removed) which means that the 
subject cannot be identified, thus preserving the privacy of the data subject whilst allowing 
access to the data for research purposes. Anonymised personal data falls outside the scope 
of the GDPR as Recital 26 makes clear.52 While this exclusion favours researchers there is a 
major problem with anonymisation as there are technologies currently available that can be 
used to re-identify individuals from anonymised data. According to  Narayanan and  
Shmatikov, ‘[j]ust as medieval alchemists were convinced a (mythical) philosopher’s stone can 
transmute lead into gold, today’s privacy practitioners believe that records containing 
sensitive individual data can be de-identified  by removing or modifying PII [personally 
identifiable information]’.53 The distinction that is drawn between identifying and non-
identifying attributes by existing privacy technologies for the purposes of anonymising54 is 
‘increasingly meaningless as the amount and variety of publicly available information about 
individuals grows exponentially’.55 Anonymization therefore is not a silver bullet. However 
anonymization should not be dismissed as a whole. There are codes of practice that may be 
helpful in reducing the risk of re-identification. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office 
Code of Practice on anonymisation56 is one such code of practice. It is helpful towards  
assessing the risk of re-identification even though it clearly admits ‘that the risk of re-
identification through data linkage is essentially unpredictable because it can never be 
assessed with certainty what data is already available or what data may be released in the 
future. It is also generally unfeasible to see data return (ie (i.e.) recalling data or removing it 
from a website) as a safeguard given the difficulty, or impossibility, of securing the deletion 
or removal of data once it has been published. That is why it is so important to take great 
care, and to carry out as thorough a risk analysis as is possible, at the initial stage of producing 
and disclosing anonymised data.’57 It provides a list of issues to consider in the process of 
anonymization such as assessing the ‘risk of piecing different bits of information together to 
                                                 
51 The word ‘de-identification’ is used here to mean ‘anonymisation’. It could also be used to refer to various methods which create 
a distance between the data and identities of subjects such as encryption, sharding (fragmentation of data) and 
pseudonymisation. (In this work package pseudonymisation is discussed separately since the GDPR does apply to 
peeudonymisation. For further on the various methods for distancing data from personal identities see W Kuan Hon, C Millard 
and I Walden (2011) ‘The problem of ‘personal data’ in cloud computing – what information is regulated? The cloud of unknowing’ 
International Data Privacy Law 1(4): 211 – 228 ,< https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1783577 > accessed 1 
September 2016.   
52 It states, ‘The principles of data protection should ... not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not 
relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data 
subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous 
information, including for statistical or research purposes’. 
53 A Narayanan & V Schmatikov (2010) ‘Privacy and security: Myths and fallacies of “personally identifiable information”’ 
Communications of ACM 53(8): 24-26. 
54 L. Sweeney (2002) ‘Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generalization and suppression’ International Journal on 
Uncertainty, Fuzziness, and Knowledge-Based Systems 10(5): 571-588. 
55 Narayanan (n 44) p 25. 
56 ICO Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Code of Practice  
< https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf > accessed 14 September 2016.  
57 Ibid. p 18. 
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create a picture of someone ..  whether the information have the same characteristics to 
facilitate data linkage [such as] the same code number … to refer to the same individual in 
different datasets, … what technical measures might be used to achieve re-identification’…. 
[and where] a penetration test has been carried out, what re- identification vulnerabilities did 
it reveal.’58 In this context the ICO stresses the importance of governance and advises 
organisations anonymising personal data have an effective and comprehensive governance 
structure which also includes oversight of governance arrangements at a senior level.59 
3.5.2. Processing pseudonymised data 
The GDPR makes a distinction between anonymisation and pseudonymisation, with the latter 
falling within GDPR. Pseudonymisation, according to the GDPR, is ‘the processing of personal 
data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data 
subject without the use of additional information’. 60 The  ‘additional information is [to be] 
kept separately and … subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the 
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person’.61 
Pseudonymisation of personal data is seen by the framers of the GDPR as ‘reducing the risks 
to the data subjects concerned and help controllers and processors to meet their data-
protection obligations.’62 Pseudonymisation does not take the data processing outside the 
remit of the GDPR. It ‘is not intended to preclude any other measures of data protection’.63  
Pseudonymisation is likely to prove an important tool for processing of large data sets for 
research purposes. So RICHFIELDS can utilise pseudonymisation for the purposes of research. 
However, the RI as controller64 ‘has to take technical and organisational measures necessary 
to ensure, for the processing concerned, that [GDPR] is implemented, and that additional 
information for attributing the personal data to a specific data subject is kept separately. The 
controller processing the personal data should indicate the authorised persons within the 
same controller’.65 
3.6. Who has to comply with GDPR and their responsibilities 
The GDPR identifies two parties who are required to comply with the GDPR. They are the 
‘controller’ and the ‘processor’. ‘Controller’ is defined as ‘the natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data’ and ‘processor’ as ‘a natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the 
controller’.66 The definitions make clear that a controller or a processor can be an individual, 
companies, institutions such as associations, charitable organisations, educational 
                                                 
58 Ibid. p 24. 
59 Ibid. p 39. 
60 Article 4(5). 
61 Ibid.  
62 Recital 28. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See ‘Who has to comply with GDPR and their responsibilities’ below for meaning of controller. 
65 Recital 20. 
66 Article 4. 
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establishments, and public authorities including quasi-government bodies. An illustration 
may be helpful in understanding the difference between a controller and processor. An RI 
which does not, for instance, directly collect food consumption data through apps from data 
subjects but determines the means of processing personal data it receives from third parties 
would be a controller as opposed to an entity such as a data management company or 
educational establishment that stores or catalogues the data for the controller. The latter 
would be a processor. The GDPR does not say that a controller cannot be a processor as well. 
It may well be that an RI such as RICHFIELDS could take on both roles of controller and of 
processor. The GDPR imposes responsibilities on both controllers and the processors and both 
are equally subject to fines in the event of not meeting the obligations imposed by the GDPR. 
3.6.1. Controller’s Responsibilities 
The controller is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and should also be able to 
demonstrate compliance with the principles relating to data processing of personal data.67 
These principles as set out in Article 5 are:  lawfulness, fairness and transparency; purpose 
limitation; data minimisation; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and 
accountability. To meet these responsibilities the controller must process personal data in 
relation to the data subject in a transparent manner, lawful and fair manner. This implies that 
the data subject is informed of why the data is being collected, how the data is to be 
processed and that the processing is legal. The data collected for specified and explicit 
purposes must not be processed in other contexts that is not compatible with the specified 
purposes.  The data also must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary for the 
purposes for which processed. The controller is also responsible for the data to be accurate 
and kept up to date. Where there are inaccuracies the controller is expected to take every 
reasonable step to erase or rectify the inaccuracies. The data kept in a form that permits 
identification of data subjects should not be kept for longer than necessary. And the data 
must be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security against incidents such as 
unauthorised or unlawful processing and accident loss, damage or destruction through the 
use of technical and organisational measures. However Article 89(1) allows derogation from 
purpose limitation and storage limitation for archiving purposes in the public interest, 
scientific or historical research or statistical purposes subject to implementation of the 
appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of 
the data subject. 
 
The controller is responsible for the implementation of appropriate technical and 
organizational measures to ensure that processing is performed in accordance with the GDPR 
and must also be to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with the GDPR. 
The controller may demonstrate compliance through adherence to approved codes of 
                                                 
67 Article 5(2). 
19 
 
 
conduct68 or certification mechanisms69. In implementing appropriate measures the nature, 
scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and 
severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons have to be taken into account.70 These 
measures have to be reviewed and updated where necessary.71 Measures that the controller 
may take include allocation of responsibilities for data protection, a data protection impact 
assessment, risk mitigation plan, implementation of pseudonymization (the processing of 
personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific 
data subject without the use of additional information), and data minimization in order to 
meet the requirements of the GDPR and protect the rights of data subjects.72  
 
Where there are several organizations that share the responsibility for the processing of 
personal data, the GDPR recognises the existence of joint controllers and they must 
determine their respective responsibilities by agreement and provide the content of this 
agreement to the data subjects, defining the means of communication with processors with 
a single point of contact.73 According to Article 35 impact assessments will be required where 
the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing is likely to result in high risk to the 
rights and freedoms of natural persons. The GDPR itself does not give a methodology for 
assessing and managing risk but it is important that controllers and processors adopt a 
consistent approach.74 The controller should have prior consultation with the supervisory 
authority75 where the data protection impact assessment under Article 35 indicates that the 
processing would result in a high risk in the absence of measures taken by the controller to 
mitigate the risk.76 
3.6.2. Processor’s Responsibilities 
Where a controller uses a processor to carry out processing on his behalf the controller must 
use processors who provide sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and 
organizational measures in such a manner that the processing will meet the requirements of 
the GDPR and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject.77  So where a controller 
located in the EU uses a processor from a non-EU state it is imperative that the controller 
ensures that the processor complied with the standards imposed by the GDPR. Failure to 
comply will attract penalties and both the controller and the processor can be fined. In 
deciding on the amount of administrative fine the degree of responsibility of the controller or 
                                                 
68 Article 40. 
69 Article 42. 
70 Article 24(1). 
71 Article 24(3). 
72 Article 25(1). 
73 Article 26 (1). 
74 The following documents may be useful for assessing privacy risk: CNIL Methodology for Privacy Risk Management: How to 
Implement the Data Protection Act  https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/typo/document/CNIL-ManagingPrivacyRisks-
Methodology.pdf (accessed 10 October 2017); ICO Conducting Privacy Impact Assessments Code of Practice   < 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1595/pia-code-of-practice.pdf> (accessed 10 October 2017). 
75 Under Article 58 the supervising authority has both investigative and corrective powers. 
76 Article 36. 
77 Article 28. 
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processor taking into account technical and organisational measures implemented by them78 
will be taken into account. 
 
The GDPR mentions adherence to approved codes of conduct and also certifications as a 
means of demonstrating compliance. It is not clear whether codes of conduct and certification 
in the form of seals by an association or industry accredited body79 will have pan-European 
effect. This is an area that requires further elucidation from the European Data Protection 
Body that is to be set up by the GDPR.80  
 
At this juncture mention must be made of The International Organisation for 
Standardisation’s (ISO) 27001 which may provide a partial framework for information security 
management though it does not meet all the requirements of the GDPR. There is also ISO 
27018 which lists safeguards to increase the level of protection of PII in public clouds and 
these include:  (1) rights of the customer to access and delete the data, (2) processing the 
data only for the purpose for which the customer has provided this data, (3) recording all the 
disclosures of personal data, (4) disclosing the information about all the sub-contractors used 
for processing the personal data, (5) notification to the customer in case of a data breach, (6) 
document management for cloud policies and procedures, (7) policy for return, transfer and 
disposal of personal data, (8) confidentiality agreements for individuals who can access 
personal data, (9) records of user access to the cloud, (10) specifying the minimum security 
controls in contracts with customers and subcontractors, (11) deletion of data in storage 
assigned to other customers, (12) disclosing to the cloud customer in which countries will the 
data be stored, and (13) ensuring the data reaches the destination. 
 
It is difficult to say whether the adoption of the ISO standards would make an organisation or 
an institution fully GDPR compliant though certain aspects of ISO 27001 and 27018 might 
reflect best practices to follow especially where personal data are processed in the cloud. 
Hence they are useful documents to scrutinise closely within governance mechanisms of an 
RI.  
3.6.3. Security and Notification 
The GDPR requires controllers/processors to consider security measures. These include 
pseudonymisation, ensuring integrity, confidentiality, availability and resilience of processing 
systems, regular testing, assessing and evaluating security measures etc.81 It should include 
not only day-to-day running but also the risks that such a system would face and what 
measures have been put in place to ensure (at least lower) the risk of security breaches. In 
                                                 
78 Article 83 2(d). 
79 According to Article 40(2) ‘[A]ssociations and other bodies representing categories of controllers or processors may prepare 
codes of conduct, or amend or extend such codes, for the purpose of specifying the application of this Regulation …’. 
80 Article 68. See also Article 70 on the tasks of the Board.  
81 Article 32. 
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the event of a security breach (however minor) affecting personal data it must be notified  by 
the controller to the supervisory authority no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of 
the breach unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons. If the controller is unable to notify within the time frame then 
the notification should be accompanied by reasons for the delay. 82 Where there is a high risk 
to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects then the notification also needs to be sent to 
data subjects.83 As for the processor, he is under an obligation to notify the controller of the 
breach without undue delay.84 
 
A notification to supervisory authority should describe the nature of the personal data breach 
including where possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects concerned 
and the categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned; the likely 
consequences of the personal data breach, the measures taken or proposed to be taken by 
the controller to address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate, measures 
to mitigate its possible adverse effects; and communicate the name and contact details of the 
data protection officer or other contact point where more information can be obtained.85 
Article 33 also places the controller under an obligation to document any personal data 
breaches, comprising the facts relating to the personal data breach, its effects and the 
remedial action taken. This documentation is to enable the supervisory authority to verify 
compliance with Article 33.  
 
Where a breach requires communication to a data subject  it must express in clear and plain 
language the nature of the personal data breach  and describe the likely consequences of the 
personal data breach, the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller to 
address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate, measures to mitigate its 
possible adverse effects, and provide the name and contact details of the data protection 
officer or other contact point where more information can be obtained.86 However 
communication to the data subject is not required where ’(a) the controller has implemented 
appropriate technical and organisational protection measures, and those measures were 
applied to the personal data affected by the personal data breach, in particular those that 
render the personal data unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access it, such 
as encryption; the controller has taken subsequent measures which ensure that the high risk 
to the rights and freedoms of data subjects …is no longer likely to materialise; (c) it would 
involve disproportionate effort.’ 87 In such a case, data subjects can be informed through 
public communication or a similar measure that is equally effective. 
                                                 
82 Article 33. 
83 Article 34. 
84 Article (34(2). 
85 Article 33(3). 
86 Article 34(2). 
87 Article 34(3). 
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While this Report does not look in any detail at the consequences of infringements of the 
Regulation for the controller and the processor Articles 82 gives a person88 the right to receive 
compensation from the controller or processor for the damage (be it material or non-material 
damage) suffered as a result of an infringement. Administrative fines can be also imposed on 
the controller and the processor under Article 83. The decision about whether to impose a 
fine and the amount will be taken in light of factors such as the nature, gravity and duration 
of the infringement, the nature, scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the 
number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them, any action taken 
by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage suffered by data subjects and the 
degree of co-operation with the supervisory authority.89   
 
The amount of fines will depend on the nature of the infringement such as the processes of 
obtaining consent or implementation of technical and organisational measures. For instance 
an infringement of Article 2590 relating to implementation of data minimisation and 
pseudonymisation could attract ‘administrative fines up to 10 000 000 EUR, or in the case of 
an undertaking, up to 2 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial 
year, whichever is higher’.91 Whereas, infringements of  the basic principles for processing,92 
including conditions for consent would attract fines of up to ‘20 000 000 EUR, or in the case 
of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial 
year, whichever is higher’.93  The administrative fines are high thus reinforcing the seriousness 
with which the GDPR regards the rights of data subjects in respect of their personal data.  
3.6.4. Data Protection Officer  
The GDPR requires the controller and the processor to designate a data protection officer 
(DPO) where (1) processing is carried out by a public authority or body, or (2) where the core 
activities of the controller/processor consist of processing operations which by virtue of their 
nature, their scope and/or purposes, require regular and systematic monitoring of data 
subjects on a large scale; or (3) where the core activities of the controller/processor consist 
                                                 
88 The GDPR does not use the term data subject in Article 82 but uses ‘person’ suggesting thereby it includes natural and legal 
persons. 
89 See Article 83(2) for a full list. 
90 Article 25 reads: 
1.     Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing 
as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, the 
controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement 
appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection 
principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in 
order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. 
2.     The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal 
data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of 
personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such 
measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite 
number of natural persons. 
3.     An approved certification mechanism pursuant to Article 42 may be used as an element to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. 
91 Article 83(4). 
92 See Articles 5,6,7 and 9. 
93 Article 83(5). 
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of processing a large scale special categories pursuant to special categories of data or data 
relating to criminal convictions and offences.94  
 
This means that an RI such as RICHFIELDS that is likely to monitor consumption behaviour of 
data subjects and purchase habits would require a DPO. According to the GDPR the DPO could 
be a member of staff of the controller or the processor or can be appointed through a service 
contract.95 The appointment has to be on the basis of professional qualities and expert 
knowledge of data protection law and practices.96 The DPO must be suitably qualified to 
perform the tasks as set out in the GDPR.  In performing these he should have due regard to 
the risk associated with processing operations, against the context, nature, scope, context 
and purposes of processing.97 The tasks are as listed below: 
• to inform and advise the controller or the processor and the employees who carry out 
processing of their obligations pursuant to this Regulation and to other Union or 
Member State data protection provisions; 
• to monitor compliance with this Regulation, with other Union or Member State data 
protection provisions and with the policies of the controller or processor in relation to 
the protection of personal data, including the assignment of responsibilities, 
awareness-raising and training of staff involved in processing operations, and the 
related audits; 
• to provide advice where requested as regards the data protection impact assessment 
and monitor its performance pursuant to Article 35; 
• to cooperate with the supervisory authority; and  
• to act as the contact point for the supervisory authority on issues relating to 
processing, including the prior consultation referred to in Article 36, and to consult, 
where appropriate, with regard to any other matter.98 
3.7. Rights of Data Subjects 
As stated in Section Three individuals have the right to enjoy effective control over their 
personal information. The GDPR gives a number of rights to data subjects and these include 
the right to access,99 right to rectification100 and the right of erasure (also known as the right 
to be forgotten),101  right to restriction of processing,102 and the right to object.103  
 
                                                 
94 Article 37(1). 
95 Article 37(6). 
96 Article 37(5). 
97 Article 39(2). 
98 Article 39(1) (a) – (e). See also ‘Controller’s responsibilities’ above. 
99 Article 15. 
100 Article 16. 
101 Article 17. 
102 Article 19. 
103 Article 21. 
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Under the right to access, the data subject can ask the  controller to provide information on 
whether they process any personal data about him or her and where this is the case require 
access to the held data. Data subjects can also seek information about matters such as the 
purposes of the processing, categories of personal data concerned, the recipients to whom 
the personal data have been or will be disclosed(in particular recipients in third countries or 
international organisations), and the period for which the personal data will be stored and 
the criteria for determining the period of storage. They can also seek information from the 
controller about rectification/restriction or erasure of personal data and to object to 
processing. The controller can also be requested information about the right to lodge a 
complaint with the supervisory authority. Since it is possible that the data was obtained from 
a third source and not personally collected from the data subject he/she can seek information 
from the controller of the source of the data. So RIs that are reliant on data from third parties 
should be prepared to inform the data subject of the source of the data supply when 
requested by the data subject. 
 
The right to rectification of data is self-explanatory but when requested the controller must 
do so without undue delay. Similarly, where a data subject requests that information about 
him/her be erased these must be done without undue delay by the controller. The obligation 
to erase is dependent on the following: 
• the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they 
were collected or otherwise processed; 
• withdrawal of consent by the data subject; 
• unlawful processing of personal data; 
• objection to the processing on the basis that the data has been obtained for 
directing marketing purposes, including profiling. 
 
In the event of the controller being obliged to erase but the data has been made public the 
controller whilst ‘taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall 
take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are 
processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such 
controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data’.104 
 
The data subject also has the right to obtain from the controller a restriction of processing in 
situations listed below: 
 
• the accuracy of the personal data is contested by the data subject, for a period 
enabling the controller to verify the accuracy of the personal data; 
                                                 
104 Article 17(2). 
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• the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the 
personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead; 
• the controller no longer needs the personal data for the purposes of the 
processing, but they are required by the data subject for the establishment, 
exercise or defence of legal claims; 
• the data subject has objected to processing pursuant to Article 21(1) pending the 
verification whether the legitimate grounds of the controller override those of the 
data subject.105 
Under Article 21, the data subject has the right to object to processing. Where such a right 
has been raised the controller should not process the personal data unless the controller can 
demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, 
rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal 
claims.106 It is possible under Article 21(6) for the data subject to object, on grounds relating 
to his or her particular situation,  where personal data are processed for scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes pursuant to Article 89(1)107 unless the processing is 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of public interest. 
 
As can be seen from the above the GDPR gives the data subjects a lot of control over their 
personal data unless they are overridden by legitimate interests such as public interest and  
legal claims. Controllers therefore should have appropriate mechanisms in their organisation 
that can deal with the requests of data subjects and deal with them effectively and efficiently. 
An RI dealing with huge data sets will also need to have appropriate mechanisms. The 
appropriate form and its constitution will need to be addressed in the governance structure 
along with drawing up suitable protocols for complaints procedures to receive and deal with 
requests from data subjects. 
3.8. Trans-border Data Transfer  
As stated in the Introduction, the GDPR’s intention is to bring about harmonisation in the data 
protection laws as between member states. So transfer of data between member states 
should pose no problems. However ‘flows of personal data to and from countries outside the 
Union and international organisations are necessary for the expansion of international trade 
and international cooperation.’108 The GDPR’s aim is to ensure that the level of protection of 
natural persons imparted by it is not undermined as a result of onward transfer to third 
countries and onward transfer from that third country to controllers or processors in that 
country or another third country.109 Transfers are made possible to third countries or 
                                                 
105 Article 18(1). 
106 Article 21(1). 
107 See ‘Rights of controller’. 
108 Recital 101.  
109 Article 44 reads: 
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international organisation provided the safeguard mechanisms are satisfied.  So transfer 
would be possible where the European Commission has decided that ‘the third country, a 
territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the international 
organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection.’110 An adequate level of 
protection would essentially be equivalent to that ensured in the European Union.111 The 
Commission assesses the adequacy of protection in the third state by considering a number 
of factors such as respect for human rights, rule of law, existence and effective function of 
independent supervisory authority with responsibility for ensuring and enforcing compliance 
with the data protection rules, in the third country or to which an international organisation 
is subject, and ‘international commitments the third country or international organisation 
concerned has entered into, or other obligations arising from legally binding conventions or 
instruments as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular 
in relation to the protection of personal data.’112 
 
In the absence of the adequacy safeguard, transfer of personal data by a controller or 
processor to a third country  or an international organisation is possible where the controller 
or processor has provided appropriate safeguards and provided enforceable data subject 
rights, and effective legal remedies.113 Appropriate safeguards include legally binding and 
enforceable instrument between public bodies, binding corporate rules (BCR), approved code 
of conduct or approved certification mechanisms along with binding commitments from the 
controller or processor in the third country to apply the appropriate safeguards in respect of 
rights of data subjects.114  Standard data protection contractual clauses approved by the 
Commission as well as by the supervisory  authorities can also be used and  these would not 
need prior authorisation by the supervisory authority.115 Standard clauses that are currently 
in use may be valid though their repeal is possible under the GDPR. The use of existing 
standard data protection clauses has an advantage in that they lower the administrative costs, 
such as legal costs in the drafting of suitable data protection clauses.  
 
BCRs that have to approved by the competent supervisory authority should be ‘legally binding 
and apply to and are enforced by every member concerned of the group of undertakings,116 
                                                 
Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third 
country or to an international organisation shall take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, the 
conditions laid down in this Chapter are complied with by the controller and processor, including for onward transfers of 
personal data from the third country or an international organisation to another third country or to another international 
organisation. All provisions in this Chapter shall be applied in order to ensure that the level of protection of natural persons 
guaranteed by this Regulation is not undermined. 
110 Article 45 (1). 
111 Recital 104. 
112 Article 45 (2) (a)-(c). 
113 Article 46(1). 
114 Article 46(2). 
115 Article 46 (2) (c) & (d). 
116 ‘group of undertakings’ is defined as ‘a controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings’ Article 4 (19). 
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or group of enterprises117 engaged in a joint economic activity, including their employees’ and 
‘must expressly confer enforceable rights in data subjects with regard to the processing of 
personal data’118 The BCR must at the very least meet the specific requirements listed in 
Article 47(2) which include: 
 
• structure and contact details of the group of undertakings, or group of enterprises 
engaged in a joint economic activity and of each of its members, the data transfers 
or set of transfers, including the categories of personal data, the type of processing 
and its purposes, the type of data subjects affected and the identification of the 
third country or countries in question; their legally binding nature, both internally 
and externally;  
• the application of the general data protection principles, in particular purpose 
limitation, data minimisation, limited storage periods, data quality, data 
protection by design and by default, legal basis for processing, processing of 
special categories of personal data, measures to ensure data security, and the 
requirements in respect of onward transfers to bodies not bound by the binding 
corporate rules;  
• the rights of data subjects in regard to processing and the means to exercise those 
rights, including the right not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling, the right to lodge a complaint with the competent 
supervisory authority and before the competent courts of the Member States,  and 
to obtain redress and, where appropriate, compensation for a breach of the 
binding corporate rules;  
• the tasks of any data protection officer119 designated in accordance with Article 37 
or any other person or entity in charge of the monitoring compliance with the 
binding corporate rules within the group of undertakings, or group of enterprises 
engaged in a joint economic activity, as well as monitoring training and complaint-
handling; 
• complaints procedure; and  
• the mechanisms for reporting to the competent supervisory authority any legal 
requirements to which a member of the group of undertakings, or group of 
enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity is subject in a third country which 
are likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the guarantees provided by the 
binding corporate rules; and, the appropriate data protection training to personnel 
having permanent or regular access to personal data. 
BCRs are widely viewed as a favourable mechanism for the transfer of data since it 
substantially lowers the administrative burden of the controller and processor. Further a 
                                                 
117 Enterprise is defined as ‘a natural or legal person engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal form, including 
partnerships or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity.’ (Article 4 (18)). 
118 Article 47(1). 
119 See ‘Data protection officer’ above. 
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group of undertaking or group of enterprises can use the same BCR for the purposes of 
transfer to non-EU states. 
 
Where adequate safeguards or appropriate safeguards including BCRs cannot be met, Article 
48(1) allows transfer or sets of transfers in specific circumstances. These, for instance, include 
transfers with explicit consent of the data subject to the proposed data transfer after having 
learnt of the possible risks in the absence of adequate and appropriate safeguards, transfers 
necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the 
data subject between the controller and another natural or legal person, transfers necessary 
on the public interest, and transfers necessary for establishing, exercising or in the defence 
of legal claims.  However such transfers must not be repetitive and concerns only a limited 
number of data subjects and is necessary for the purposes of compelling legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller that do not override the data subjects’ interests or their rights and 
freedoms.  The controller is expected to have assessed all the circumstances surrounding the 
data transfer. This should guide the controller to suitable safeguards with regard to the 
protection of personal data. The supervisory authority and the data subject must be informed 
and the controller must provide compelling legitimate interests pursued for such a transfer. 
As for transfer for reasons of public interest  it must be recognised in the law of the Union or 
the controller’s Member State. 
 
RIs established in Member States in the interests of furthering research are unlikely to limit 
accessibility only to those institutions and commercial enterprises operating within EU 
borders. The accessibility is likely to be global and many non-EU countries are yet to have 
strong data protection laws and where they do they are not as rigorous as the GDPR. In these 
circumstances, an RI needs to include within its governance structure mechanisms that 
ensure that the protection  of data subjects is not compromised. The governance structures 
of the RI have to be sufficiently robust to assess requests, the third party’s mechanisms and 
compliance with the GDPR and where appropriate negotiate suitable data protection clauses 
the do not compromise the data subjects’ rights. 
4. Design of Ethical/Legal Aspects of RICHFIELDS 
As seen from Section Three the protection of personal data (or personally identifiable 
information) of data subjects is at the heart of the GDPR. With this focus it introduces a 
number of obligations on the controllers and processors for lawful processing which include 
informed consent from the data subject, purpose limitation (unless further data processing is 
compatible with the initial purpose for collection or for scientific or historical research 
purposes), use of pseudonymisation to reduce risks associated with processing of personal 
data, implementation of appropriate technical, organisational and security measures,  trans-
border data transfer, data protection officer, giving control to data subjects over their 
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personal data through mechanism such as right to rectification and withdrawal of consent. 
The ethical issues that were raised in Section II in fact are embedded in the EU data protection 
framework and finds legal expression in the GDPR. The end result is that a non-compliant 
organisation will attract stiff penalties. In designing RICHFIELDS attention must be paid to the 
obligations created by the GDPR. 
 
RICHFIELDS will be collecting data from a variety of sources which are likely to include data 
from apps, social media and store loyalty cards. The consent obtained by these sources may 
not all meet the consent standards required by the GDPR where data is being processed for 
purposes other than originally envisaged. Close scrutiny of the consent forms and terms of 
use of the data suppliers will need to be examined to see whether data subjects have 
consented to further processing. If they are unsatisfactory in GDPR terms consent will have 
to be specifically obtained for processing by the RI. This is likely to prove administratively 
cumbersome and costly. It may however be possible for RICHFIELDS to use the data for 
scientific purposes under the GDPR.  But, in the absence of any clear guidance (even though 
the Recitals of the GDPR recognises the importance of data for research) it is difficult to say 
with great conviction that re-purposing of the kind envisaged by RICHFIELDS would always 
pass scrutiny.  
 
The new concept of pseudonymisation provides a useful route for RICHFIELDS. It is meant to 
reduce risks whilst maintaining the usefulness of the data. The GDPR actively encourages the 
controllers to pseudonymise the data they collect by introducing separation. In 
pseudonymisation the data cannot be attributed to a particular data subject without the use 
of additional information and this additional information has to be kept separately from the 
processed data. Where additional data are kept separately it may still be possible for there to 
be security breaches (for instance, obtaining of the key to the additional information) which 
enable the linking of the additional data to the pseudonymised data. To address this 
controllers need to implement appropriate safeguards for unauthorised reversal of 
pseudonymisation. Safeguards could include technical measures such as encryption and other 
organisational measures on the ways in which the de-identification key will be protected from 
access. Controllers may decide, taking into account the potential risks for reversal to delete 
the directly identifying data. In these circumstances the controller will have benefit of the 
exemption from the rights to access, rectification, erasure and data portability allowed to 
data subjects by the GDPR provided the inability of the controller to identify the data subject 
is demonstrated.  
 
RICHFIELDS which will determine the purposes and means of the processing of personal data 
is a controller and will need to have appropriate technical and organisational measures that 
takes into account the nature, scope, context and the purposes of processing (without losing 
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sight of the risks for the rights and freedoms of data subjects) to ensure that the processing 
(even where it utilises pseudonymised data) is GDPR compliant. RICHFIELDS must consider 
the adoption of approved codes of conduct and certification mechanisms. There might not be 
a current off-the-shelf code of conduct that meets the compliance requirements of the GDPR 
and therefore RICHFIELDS should consider devising a code of conduct with the advice of 
lawyers, IT and security specialists and data protection practitioners.  
 
The assumption here is that RICHFIELDS will be a controller but will outsource storage of data 
and processing to another organisation. In this event RICHFIELDS will have to ensure that the 
appointed processors are GDPR compliant.  
 
Security measures are paramount and these need to be addressed by RICHFIELDS. Besides 
pseudonymisation, it should include integrity, resilience of processing systems and regular 
testing of the system for vulnerabilities and regular evaluation.  
 
The GDPR, as indicated earlier, imposes stiff penalties in the event of a breach. RICHFIELDS 
therefore needs to have insurance to cover legal costs and for all the liabilities that arise under 
the GDPR. 
 
There must also be systems in place that can respond to the data subjects’ queries and their 
requests based on the rights under the GDPR such as the right to erase, rectify, object and 
restriction of processing. The body responsible for handling and dealing with such requests 
within RICHFIELDS could also take advice from the independent ethics committee (suggested 
below).  
 
RICHFIELDS which is likely to monitor consumption behaviour of data subjects and purchase 
habits amongst others would need a DPO (data protection officer). It is not essential that the 
DPO is a member of the organisation where RICHFIELDS is located. A DPO with appropriate 
professional qualifications can be appointed on the basis of a service contract. The officer will 
be responsible for providing advice on compliance, monitor compliance, raise awareness and 
act as a contact point for the supervisory authority.  
 
Freedom of formation is not specifically mentioned in the GDPR but RICHFIELDS may need to 
put in place a mechanism that enable such requests to be handled efficiently and effectively. 
One possibility is to ask the DPO to act also as an FOI officer.  
 
Since RICHFIELDS is likely to be of global application there will be trans-border data transfer. 
Not all requests for research data are going to originate from states which are recognised by 
the EU as having adequate standards. RICHFIELDS should therefore consider using standard 
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data protection clauses or BCRs (Business Corporate Rules) which will require authorisation 
by the supervisory authority. 
 
The establishment of an independent ethics committee drawing upon a range of stakeholders 
(research institutions, the legal profession, IT professionals, commercial entities, non-
governmental organisations and consumer bodies) for monitoring the activities of 
RICHFIELDS, its protocols on matters relating to security, transfer of data to third countries, 
assessing the genuineness of request by data users and the rules of operation in the event of 
requests that may be ethically dubious or questionable, data subjects’ requests, and 
complaints procedures. 
 
The governance structure of RICHFIELDS therefore will have to incorporate within it the 
setting up of  appropriate bodies and committees, allocation of responsibilities for various 
tasks such as appointment of personnel (e.g. the DPO), conducting risk assessment, 
establishing robust security systems, the processes for obtaining data from various data 
suppliers and their level of integrity,  overseeing the contractual agreements with 
researchers, transfer of data to third countries, and reporting and monitoring processes for 
GDPR compliance. It should also consider the suitability of an independent ethics committee 
and how this should be structured.  
5. Conclusion and Potential for Future Developments 
This Report has outlined the ethical issues that arise in the context of big data and an account 
(albeit brief) of the provisions that are of interest to RICHFIELDS. Section 4 has listed a number 
of areas that RICHFIELDS should focus on to make it GDPR compliant. Given its purpose is to 
use the data sets in  its repository for research, pseudonymisation is suggested as a means to 
process the data, provided appropriate safeguards are in place. In order to raise the integrity 
profile of RICHFIELDS externally the setting up of an independent ethics committee is also 
suggested. This would also help in bolstering the confidence of data in the utility of RIs such 
as RICHFIELDS as a research tool for promoting well-being and over time might usher in an 
era where data subjects in the spirit of altruism give their data for the sake of research and 
innovation. 
 
At some point in the future there is a high likelihood that RICHFIELDS will link up with other 
RIs devoted to nutrition and healthcare thus creating remarkable opportunities for research 
and for devising innovative personalised diet and health care that would be of immense 
benefit to society. In the event of linking RIs ranging from food consumption and nutrition to 
health to form a super RI, compliance with the GDPR will still be of paramount importance 
subject to any derogations available in respect of research and health in the GDPR. 
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